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Abstract 
Whether a child begotten from artificial insemination is legitimate or 
illegitimate according to the law is an important question. In other words, 
the status of legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child is crucial as it will 
determine the child’s entitlement to many rights, especially those within 
the family circle, such as maintenance, care and upbringing, inheritance, 
etc. A child is legitimate if its parents have intermarried when it is begotten 
or born. The fact that conception is effected not by adultery or fornication 
but by a method not involving sexual intercourse does not in principle seem 
to alter the concept of legitimacy. The paper aims to analyse the extent of 
the applicability of the legitimacy test laid down in section 112 of the 
Evidence Act 1950 and whether it is justified in today’s time in view of the 
scientific developments such as artificial insemination and many other 
methods which don’t require the physical presence of a man and woman 
for the child’s conception. Hence, one of the contentious issues is whether 
or not the presumption of legitimacy embodied in section 112 applies in 
cases where children are born through Assisted Reproductive Technology 
(ART). The paper concludes that section 112 embodies the irrebuttable 
presumption of legitimacy of a child born out of valid wedlock. The section 
establishes the fact of marriage as conclusive proof of legitimacy. In 
addition, the paper also concludes that section 112 can be easily interpreted 
to include Homologous Artificial Insemination (AIH) because, in this case, 
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the husband is the biological or natural father of the child. The paper 
recommends a need to streamline the process of artificial insemination in 
Malaysia and address the legal, ethical as well as technical issues that 
follow by way of legislative intervention. 
Keywords: Adultery, artificial insemination, assisted reproductive 
technology, Evidence Act, fornication, homologous artificial insemination, 
illegitimate, legitimate, sexual intercourse. 
1. Introduction 
Infertility can be devastating for those affected, but developments in 
assisted reproduction mean that there are now several ways couples can be 
helped.[1] One of these ways is through the process of artificial 
insemination. In other words, technical advancement in medical science 
gives new hope to an infertile couple through artificial insemination. 
However, it is important to note from the onset that the accumulation of 
technology with the law is still awaited. For example, the advancement 
creates a large number of socio-legal issues. Legal presumption of paternity 
is one of them. Is a child illegitimate when born by artificial insemination 
of a married woman using the semen of a third-party donor with her 
husband’s consent? Basically, common law recognises the legitimacy of a 
child that is born out of human sexual activity. [2] Therefore, for a child born 
from artificial conception procedures, the sperm and the ovum that 
produces the child must come from the respective parties to a marriage. [3] 
The paper submits that while advances in reproductive medicine have 
generally been welcomed for giving much-needed hope to infertile couples, 
there have also been strong voices of dissent. Concern tends to focus on 
what is perceived as the potential use of these treatments for social, as 
opposed to medical reasons. 
This paper aims to analyse s. 112 of the Evidence Act 1950, which deals 
with the issue of the legitimacy of a child. Section 112 embodies the 
irrebuttable presumption of legitimacy of a child born out of a valid 
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marriage. The section establishes the fact of marriage as conclusive proof 
of legitimacy. It is important to note that the legislative intent of the 
provision is to protect the rights and interests of the children and chastity 
of women. Regardless of this legislative intent, the main problem with s . 112 
is that it presumes sexual intercourse is essential for a child’s conception. 
Under s. 112, it is specifically mentioned that if a man could not possibly 
have had sexual intercourse, he cannot be the child’s father. By noting this 
legal position, it is vital to address the legitimacy of a child conceived from 
artificial insemination. The paper submits that the language of s . 112 can 
be easily interpreted to include cases of AIH since the husband is the 
biological father of the child. It should not pose any legal issues for the 
simple reason that in this process, the sperm of the husband is united with 
the wife’s ova, although through artificial and not by the usual method. In 
analysing s. 112 of the Evidence Act 1950, the paper is divided into five 
parts, excluding the introduction. The first part addresses the definition or 
meaning of artificial insemination. This part of the discussion is essential, 
especially in the context of Malaysia. As a country, Malaysia has to 
formulate its own laws accommodating the local customs instead of blindly 
copying laws from other jurisdictions. The second part of the paper deals 
with the legal position of artificial insemination in Malaysia. Under this 
part, the paper focuses on the position of the law relating to artificial 
insemination in Malaysia. The third part of the paper addresses the 
presumption of legitimacy under s. 112 of the Evidence Act 1950. Again, 
this part is considered necessary in understanding the position of the law 
relating to the legitimacy of a child conceived through artificial 
insemination. The fourth part of the paper addresses the issue of the legality 
of a child vis-à-vis artificial insemination. In other words, what is the legal 
position of a child born as a result of artificial insemination? Is the child 
considered legitimate or illegitimate? As mentioned earlier, the status of 
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child is essential in determining parental 
duties vis-à-vis a child’s rights. The fifth part of the paper focuses on the 
conclusion. Apart from the conclusion, this part also addresses some 
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recommendations that could be implemented in the operation of s. 112 of 
the Evidence Act 1950 to address the issue of the legitimacy of a child born 
as a result of artificial insemination. 
2. Definition/Meaning of Artificial Insemination 
Artificial insemination, being one of the Assisted Reproductive 
Technology (ART) methods, is a scientific technique for artificial 
procreation that involves the artificial introduction of sperm into a 
woman’s uterus without sexual intercourse. Procedurally, artificial 
insemination is performed by placing the sperm in the woman’s vagina, 
cervix, or uterus. Placing it in the vagina is effective only when a 
mechanical problem precludes semen from being deposited there. 
Therefore, placing sperm in the cervix brings it closer to its ultimate 
destination, the fallopian tube, where it is hoped that an egg awaits. [4] In 
other words, artificial insemination is a technique whereby a man ’s sperm 
is mechanically introduced into a woman’s vagina with the intention that 
conception should take place. Broadly speaking, it can take up two forms; 
Homologous Artificial Insemination (AIH), where the woman is 
inseminated with the sperm of her husband, and Heterologous Artificial 
Insemination (AID), where the woman is inseminated with the sperm of a 
donor.[5] 
In addition, artificial insemination is the sexual fertilisation of ova with 
semen. There are two types of such a procedure: external and internal. 
Internal artificial insemination is a recourse to overcome male infertility. 
The process involves the injection of the sperm into a woman’s uterus. The 
sperm may be procured from the husband or comes from a third party (a 
donor).[6] In short, artificial insemination introduces semen into the female 
reproductive tract by mechanical means to effect pregnancy without sexual 
intercourse. Therefore, as mentioned earlier, artificial insemination in 
which the husband’s semen is used is referred to as AIH, and that in which 
a donor’s semen is used is termed AID. In the context of this paper, it is 
important to understand the types of methods used for artificial 
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insemination in analysing s. 112 of the Evidence Act 1950. 
3. The Legal Position of Artificial Insemination in Malaysia 
The Malaysian legal scenario is a unique blend of Islamic laws and civil 
laws. In other words, the legal system of the country is recognised as a 
dual-type, i.e., the Islamic laws are applied conjunctively with the civil 
laws. In the context of this paper, the authors submit that there is no 
legislation under civil law that governs the act of artificial insemination or 
the status of a child resulting from such a method. However, one relevant 
legislation governing family matters amongst non-Muslims in Malaysia is 
the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976. The Act is also silent 
about the legal position of artificial insemination as one of the ART 
methods that we commonly have in place. On the other hand, family matters  
involving Muslims are governed by Shariah law, i.e., the State Enactments. 
Again, these State Enactments are silent on the legal position of artificial 
insemination. 
Having stated that there is no legislation in the context of civil law or 
Shariah law (i.e., State Enactments) in Malaysia addressing the legal 
position of a child born as a result of artificial insemination, perhaps it is 
important to make reference to s. 112 of the Evidence Act 1950 which deals 
with the presumption of legitimacy of a child. The issue to ponder upon is 
whether s. 112 applies to Muslims. In the case of Ainan Bin Mahamud v. 
Syed Abu Bakar Bin Habib Yusoff,[7] the Evidence Act 1950 was held to be 
of general application and applicable to Muslims and non-Muslims. The 
case was relating to the execution of a deed of settlement for the benefit of 
six children. The settlor, however, denied the sixth to be his child. It was 
contended that the child was conceived before the marriage and born within 
six months of the subsisting marriage. The question arose as to whether the 
child is a legitimate son of the settlor. The Court held that in questions of 
legitimacy in the case of Muhammadans, s. 112 of the Evidence Act 1950 
applies to the exclusion of the rules of Muhammadan Law. 
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It is important to note that the above case has been criticised on the ground 
that s. 112 should not apply to Muslims. This is due to the fact that issues 
related to the legitimacy of a child among Muslims fell within the 
jurisdiction of the State laws. According to Professor Ahmad Ibrahim, 
while commenting on the subject, he opined that, although the above 
judgment provides that the Evidence Act 1950 is a statute of general 
application, Islamic law particularly is governed by State laws. [8] The above 
case was tried in the High Court. If the case were heard in the Shariah 
Court, the law applicable would have been the Islamic law enforceable in 
such States.[9] The case should have been decided based on Islamic law as 
both parties were Muslims. However, the paper concedes that the power of 
the Shariah Court at that time was lacking, and the High Court had 
jurisdiction in matters relating to Muslims. But following the constitutional 
amendment to Art. 121 of the Federal Constitution, s. 112 of the Evidence 
Act 1950 is no longer applicable to Muslims. The amendment to the 
Constitution has upgraded the status of the Shariah Courts in Malaysia, i.e., 
such Court shall have the powers to try cases within its jurisdiction 
involving Muslims without interference from the Civil Courts. [10] 
Apart from addressing the pressing issue of whether s . 112 of the Evidence 
Act 1950 applies to Muslims, it is also vital to refer to the Shariah position 
concerning the use of artificial insemination and the status of a child born 
out of such a method. On the legitimacy of using artificial insemination, 
the Sunni stand is that only AIH is allowed provided it involves the gametes 
of the married couple; it is not done posthumously or after the couple 
separates.[11] The reasons for the cautious approach adopted by the Sunni 
are firstly, marriage still in existence is the only framework for licit 
procreation according to the Quranic declaration, ‘It is He Who has created 
man from water, and has appointed for him kindred by blood, and kindred 
by marriage. And your Lord is Ever All Power to do what He wills’. [12] Or 
by the words of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), ‘The child is for the marriage 
bed and for the adulterer is stoning’.[13] Secondly, decency of sexual 
behaviour cannot be compromised as cautioned in the Quran, ‘Who abstain 
 
[2021] 1 LNS(A) cxiii Legal Network Series 7 
from sex, except with those joined to them in marriage bond, or (the 
captive) whom their right hands possess—for (in their case) they are free 
from blame? But those whose desires exceed those limits are 
transgressors’.[14] And ‘If any woman establishes sexual relationship with 
people other than her lawful husband, God would prohibit her admission 
into paradise’. At the same time, the Prophet (PBUH) said, ‘it is not 
permissible for a man who believes in God and the Hereafter  to irrigate 
with his own sperm the crop sown by another’. [15] Thirdly, it creates the 
potential for future half-sibling incest, if the offspring of the same 
anonymous donor should happen to meet and marry. [16] Finally, medicinal 
treatment through illicit means is only allowed to save lives or as a last 
resort in which a donor’s egg or posthumous egg transfer does not 
qualify.[17] Concluding from the above, the Sunni view suggests that ‘the 
problem with third-party donation, is that it destroys a child’s paternity, or 
lineage, which is considered immoral in addition to being psychologically 
devastating. The child will be deemed illegitimate and stigmatized even in 
the eyes of its own parents, who will therefore lack the appropriate parental 
sentiments’.[18] 
Having addressed the legal position of artificial insemination in Malaysia 
and pointing out the absence of clear legal provisions, i.e., civil law or 
Shariah law/State Enactments as far as the family institution is concerned, 
the paper submits that if the matter of artificial insemination involves non-
Muslims, our Courts will follow the principle of common law and the law 
in England and Wales.[19] On that note, the common law position is very 
clear that a child born due to artificial insemination is considered legitimate 
provided the sperm and the ovum came from the respective parties to a 
marriage. As for Muslims, we need to refer to the State Enactments or the 
Sunni view but subject to the conditions highlighted above. The paper also 
submits that s. 112 of the Evidence Act 1950 can be easily interpreted to 
include AIH because, in this case, the husband is the biological or natural 
father of the child. By adopting such an interpretation to s . 112, then the 
presumption provided by the section can be accommodated under Shariah 
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but subject to the conditions highlighted above in the context of the Sunni 
view. 
4. Legitimacy of Child vis-à-vis Artificial Insemination 
The arrival of the biomedical technology revolution has undeniably 
provoked many considerable discussions and debates across all segments 
of the family institution. For example, advanced medical processes have 
introduced many modern reproductive techniques, which allow conception 
to occur without resorting to sexual intercourse. These artificial 
reproductive methods have helped many couples having difficulty 
conceiving naturally to have children. Undoubtedly, it has brought great 
joy and happiness to many previously infertile couples. As mentioned 
earlier, the most common and oldest method to deal with infertility is 
artificial insemination, a technique whereby a man’s sperm is mechanically 
introduced into a woman’s vagina with the intention that conception should 
occur. In the context of this paper, it is crucial to address the legal position 
of a child born as a result of artificial insemination. In other words, is a 
child born resulting from artificial insemination considered legitimate or 
illegitimate? In response to this question, it is vital to refer to the two types 
of artificial insemination addressed earlier, i.e., the one where the 
husband’s semen is used and that in which a donor’s semen is used. The 
paper submits that extending the test of legitimacy to the children born 
through clinical impregnation involves applying the legislative spirit 
behind s. 112 to the method used for impregnation. The issue of foremost 
importance which arises here, with s. 112, is the extent to which the test of 
legitimacy as laid down in the section is justifiable in present times where 
several modern scientific developments such as artificial insemination 
don’t require the physical presence of a man and woman for the conception 
of a child. 
Looking at the two methods of artificial insemination, it would suffice to 
note that AIH does not present any difficulty from a legal point of view. 
AIH is not contrary to public policy and good morals  as the sperm and the 
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ovum that produces the child came from the respective parties to the 
marriage. Therefore, a child so conceived is a child born in wedlock and 
therefore is legitimate. In other words, the consummation of the marriage 
is done artificially as opposed to the natural process of the parties to the 
marriage having sexual intercourse. On the other hand, AID can give rise 
to socio-legal issues. Many questions arise from it that remain unresolved, 
such as: Does AID amount to the consummation of marriage? Does AID 
amount to adultery? Can a non-consenting spouse claim divorce on the 
grounds of adultery or non-consummation of marriage? Can the stranger 
donor of the male or female seed claim to be the spouse of the accepting 
donee? Is a child conceived by AID a legitimate child? If so, to whom is 
the paternity or maternity of the child to be attributed?[20] Is the woman’s 
non-consenting husband liable to maintain such a child as its father? What 
are the custodial or visitation rights of a surrogate father or mother? What 
would be the nature of the relationship of the AID child with a natural or  
adopted child of the same family? Would the rule of prohibited degrees of 
marriage be operative on a child of AID? If so, when, how, and with whom? 
Nevertheless, the UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 
recognises the possibility of conflict between partners. It makes AID illegal 
without a licence, unless it is performed through mutual agreement between 
the partners.[21] 
Furthermore, AID could also give rise to a question about the child’s 
paternity and future relationships. What happens if children of the same 
sperm donor fall in love or marry without realising they are of the same 
paternity and are actual siblings? The question of an incestuous relationship 
comes to the foreground.[22] What does the law say about it? Who is to be 
blamed? How can such mishaps be avoided? How and from whom should 
the child of AID be entitled to inherit? Can the child be also subject to the 
rules of inheritance vis-à-vis consenting or non-consenting relatives? Could 
medical professionals or institutions be liable in law following the birth of 
a defective child or failure of the process of AID? [23] 
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5. Presumption of Legitimacy under Section 112 of the Evidence Act 
1950 
The conclusive proof of the legitimacy of a child born during the 
continuance of a valid marriage is significantly analysed under s. 112 of 
the Evidence Act 1950. The section provides that:  
The fact that any person was born during the continuance of a valid 
marriage between his mother and any man, or within two hundred and 
eighty days after its dissolution, the mother remaining unmarried, shall 
be conclusive proof that he is the legitimate son of that man, unless it 
can be shown that the parties to the marriage had no access to each 
other at any time when he could have been begotten. 
Based on s. 112 above, it provides for minimum proof of the legitimacy of 
a child. For a child to be legitimate, specific requirements must be fulfilled, 
which include (i) the child must be born during the subsistence of a 
marriage; (ii) the marriage of the child’s mother to a man must be valid; 
(iii) if the child was born after divorce, it must be within two hundred and 
eighty days after the divorce of his parents, and the mother remains 
unmarried; and (iv) the parties to the marriage had access to one another at 
the time when the child is conceived. After dissecting s . 112 of the 
Evidence Act 1950, it would suffice to note that a child is presumed 
legitimate if he is born in a valid marriage or within two hundred and eighty 
days after the divorce of his parents and the mother remains unmarried. 
This presumption of legitimacy can be rebutted if both parties had no access 
to one another when the child was conceived. 
It can be understood from the express language of the provision under 
s. 112 that the legislature intends to ensure that no child is bastardised. The 
social and cultural framework of the country while framing the provisions 
of the Act must be taken into account while interpreting the same. The 
legislature’s intention has always been to maintain the sanctity of marriage 
and retain the legitimate status of any person born during wedlock unless 
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proven otherwise.[24] The term “any man” used in s. 112 of the Evidence 
Act, instead of the term husband, especially when the term “mother” is 
used, shows that the Act contemplates the unfortunate possibility of 
adultery by the woman in the marriage and still presumes legitimacy in 
favour of the child until the husband sufficiently proves non-access.[25] It 
is needless to state that this is only a rebuttable presumption.  
In dissecting s. 112 of the Evidence Act 1950, it is important to note that 
there is no difference between ‘conclusive evidence’ and ‘conclusive 
proof’. The aim of both is to give finality to the establishment of the 
existence of a fact from the proof of another. [26] Furthermore, a DNA test 
cannot rebut the conclusive presumption envisaged under s . 112 of the 
Evidence Act 1950. Hence, the parties can only avoid the rigor of such a 
conclusive presumption by proving non-access, which is negative proof.[27] 
Section 112 read with s. 4 has the effect of completely closing and 
debarring the party from leading any evidence with respect to the fact 
which the law says to be the conclusive proof of legitimacy and paternity 
of the child covered by s. 112. 
In Ng Chian Perng v. Ng Ho Peng,[28] the appellant claimed maintenance 
on behalf of her infant daughter born out of an intimate relationship 
between the appellant and the respondent. The daughter was registered with 
the respondent’s name as the father. The appellant at that time of the claim 
was married to one Phang Mow Yew. The respondent denied the allegation 
and claimed that the daughter was the legitimate child of the present 
husband, and his name was used without his knowledge. Counsel for the 
appellant requested a DNA test for which was refused by the respondent. 
Counsel also urged that the Court observe and compare the similarity 
between the respondent’s appearance and the child to establish that the 
respondent was the father. The Magistrate Court denied both requests. On 
appeal, it was held that among others, the learned magistrate was right in 
not addressing the issue of the respondent subjecting himself to the DNA 
test. The onus was on the appellant to prove that the subject child was 
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illegitimate and that the respondent was the father. Under s. 112 of the 
Evidence Act 1950, there is a strong presumption that the child was the 
husband’s legitimate child since there subsisted a valid marriage between 
the appellant and the husband at the material time of the birth. To rebut the 
presumption, the appellant must show that she and the husband had no 
access to each other at any time when the child should have been begotten.  
Looking at the case above, the Court made it clear that the presumption of 
s. 112 of the Evidence Act 1950 can only be rebutted by showing that the 
wife and the husband had no access to each other at any time when the child 
should have been begotten. Again, non-access may be proved in several 
ways, which include (i) the parties are physically separated or staying at 
two different places, which result in the sexual relationship between them 
is impossible at the time when the child should have been conceived;[29] 
and (ii) the husband is proven to be impotent or incapacitated at the time 
the child is conceived or to be conceived. [30] 
Regardless of the discussion about the presumption of legitimacy under 
s. 112 above, the gravest problem with the section is that it presumes that 
sexual intercourse is essential for a child’s conception in a woman’s womb. 
This presumption is expressed in the non-access clause to the section, i.e., 
the section says that if the man could not possibly have had sexual 
intercourse, it cannot be his child. In the context of this paper, the most 
vital issue to address is the extent of the applicability of the test of 
legitimacy provided in s. 112 of the Evidence Act 1950. Is the test 
justifiable in today’s time bearing in mind that we have several scientific 
developments such as artificial insemination, which does not require the 
physical presence of a man and woman for the conception of a child? In 
response to this question, the paper submits that s. 112 of the Evidence Act 
1950 can be easily interpreted to include AIH because, in this case, the 
husband is the biological or natural father of the child. In other words, for 
a child born from an artificial insemination procedure to be considered a 
legitimate child, the sperm and the ovum that produces the child must come 
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from the respective parties to a marriage. It is the same approach adopted 
by common law. It would also suffice to note that the Sunni stand is that a 
child born as a result of AIH is a legitimate child, but subject to certain 
conditions addressed earlier, such as the AIH involves the gametes of the 
married couple, and it is not done posthumously or after the couple 
separates. 
6. Conclusion 
Section 112 of the Evidence Act 1950 was enacted at a time when modern 
scientific advancements such as artificial insemination, in-vitro 
fertilisation, surrogacy etc., were not even contemplated by the legislature. 
Under the section, the standard of a legal presumption of legitimacy is 
conclusive proof which can only be rebutted by proving non-access by the 
parties. Again, it is to note that such non-access should be effective and 
give no opportunity for sexual intercourse. The proof of non-access is based 
on solid prima facie evidence founded on a strong preponderance of 
evidence and not merely on the balance of probabilities. As mentioned 
earlier, the main problem with s. 112 of the Evidence Act 1950 is that it 
presumes sexual intercourse is absolutely essential for the conception of a 
child. With the advancement of science and technology, s . 112 of the 
Evidence Act has been rendered less helpful, if not obsolete. Today, a  child 
can be conceived without the natural act of sexual intercourse, i.e., through 
artificial insemination. 
The paper submits that s. 112 of the Evidence Act 1950 can be easily 
interpreted to include AIH because, in this case, the husband is the 
biological or natural father of the child. In other words, a child produced 
through artificial insemination with the semen of the husband is legitimate. 
Again, the authors contend that any child made through clinical 
impregnation with the semen of a donor/AID is illegitimate with or without 
the husband’s consent. The contention is based on the unity of the marriage 
state being of prime consideration to the public interest since the family is 
the basic unit of society. Any interference with the unity of marital life  is 
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a threat to the public good and is contrary to public policy. As mentioned 
earlier, AID breaches this unity by introducing a foreign male sperm into 
the wife’s ova. 
The paper recommends that s. 112 of the Evidence Act 1950 be amended 
to expressly state the law in dealing with the presumption of legitimacy of 
a child born from artificial insemination. The new law should explicitly 
state that a child produced through artificial insemination with the semen 
of the husband is legitimate. In addition, the new law should also limit AIH 
to a valid subsisting marriage. In other words, AIH should not be done 
posthumously or after the couple separates. This is because the issue of the 
legitimacy of a child comes with other rights such as the right to inheritance 
and many more. 
Apart from amending s. 112 of the Evidence Act 1950, the paper also 
recommends that the legislature/policymakers and even the courts should 
take note of the social and cultural framework of the country while 
advocating for laws/policies addressing the topic of artificial insemination. 
Indeed, this is a developing area of the law in which changing technology 
may be expected to drive changes in the law. Hence, the idea of blindly 
copying policies or laws from other jurisdictions should not be resorted to 
without paying attention to the social and cultural framework of the 
country. For example, the UK Family Reform Act 1987 (FRA) provides 
that a child born in England and Wales after the implementation of its 
provision (viz. 4 April 1988) as the result of the artificial insemination of a 
woman who at the time of the insemination was a party to a marriage, and 
who was artificially inseminated with the semen of someone other than the 
other party to the marriage, ‘shall not be treated as the child of any person 
other than the parties to the marriage’, unless it is proved to the Court’s 
satisfaction that the other party to the marriage did not consent to the 
insemination.[31] Again, the paper submits that any child produced through 
clinical impregnation with the semen of a donor, with or without the 
husband’s consent, is illegitimate. 
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